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<cn> 5 <ct> Shareholder activism and litigation against UK banks – the limits of company 
law and the desperate resort to human rights claims? 
 
<au>Roman Tomasic and Folarin Akinbami* 
 
<a> I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Any study of shareholder litigation against directors of listed companies risks concluding 
almost as soon as it has begun. A major reason for this is the general lack of such cases, 
especially when a comparison is made with other common law jurisdictions such as the US 
and Australia.
1
 In contrast there has been much more shareholder litigation in regard to UK 
private companies. Most shareholder derivative claims in the UK and Australia involve 
private companies and not public companies.
2
 One might have expected to find that the 
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thank the British Academy for funding some data collection under the Stakeholders and Gatekeepers in 
Corporate Governance project funded under Co-Reach Project 64-033. An earlier version of this chapter was 
presented at the Conference on ‘Directors Duties and Shareholder Litigation in the Wake of the Financial 
Crisis’, The Centre for Business Law and Practice, University of Leeds, 20 September 2010. We would like to 
thank the participants at this conference for comments and feedback. We would also like to thank Ms Natalie 
Etchells LLB (Durham) for her assistance in collecting the statistics in the empirical section of the chapter. 
1
 See generally J. Armour, B.S. Black, B.R. Cheffins and R. Nolan, ‘Private Enforcement of Corporate Law: An 
Empirical Comparison of the UK and the US’ (2009) 6 Journal of Empirical Legal Studies 687; M. Legg, 
‘Shareholder Class Actions in Australia: The Perfect Storm’ (2008) 31 University of New South Wales Law 
Journal 669. 
2
 See generally J. Loughrey, A. Keay and L. Cerioni, ‘Legal Practitioners, Enlightened Shareholder Value and 
the Shaping of Corporate Governance’ (2008) 8 Journal of Corporate Law Studies 79; R. B. Thompson and R. 
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recent financial crisis might have provided opportunities for legal actions to be brought 
against directors of loss-making banks and other financial institutions, but this has not 
happened. 
Bank depositors have been reassured by an enhanced depositor protection scheme and 
have returned to the prevailing level of trust that they tended to have for banks before the 
crisis. The crisis facing highly leveraged financial institutions was triggered by a liquidity 
crisis. This liquidity crisis saw banks refuse to lend to each other because of their fears 
concerning the quality of the securities being offered – this crisis of trust between banks 
continues to some extent today. So, what are the prospects for further litigation? Banks are 
unlikely to sue each other for the failures that have occurred as they all have similar stories to 
tell and their relationships with each other are too important to be damaged by public 
litigation.
3
 What then are the prospects for shareholder litigation in response to misconduct or 
breach of duties in UK banks? The short answer is that shareholder litigation is unlikely, 
reflecting a broader failure of corporate law in the Anglo-American world.
4
 
 
<a> II. SOME CORPORATE LAW THEORIES ON SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
S. Thomas, ‘The Public and Private Faces of Derivative Lawsuits’, (2004) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 1747; R. 
B. Thompson and R. S. Thomas, ‘The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class 
Actions’ (2003) 57 Vanderbilt Law Review 133; and I. Ramsay and B. Saunders, ‘Litigation by Shareholders 
and Directors: An Empirical Study of the Australian Statutory Derivative Action’ (2006) 6 Journal of Corporate 
Law Studies 397. 
3
 This pattern was identified some years ago by Macaulay in regard to business litigation in general; see further 
S Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 American Sociological 
Review 55. 
4
 See generally K. Greenfield, The Failure of Corporate Law: Fundamental Flaws and Progressive Possibilities 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2006); T. Frankel, Trust and Dishonesty: America’s Business Culture at 
a Crossroad (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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Those who study organisations have noted that a number of options are available to those 
who are dissatisfied with the way in which their organisation is operating. Hirschman 
famously referred to the options which he described in the title of his book as ‘Exit, Voice 
and Loyalty’.5 In the context of shareholder action a variety of combinations of these 
strategies is available. Thus, the resort to the ‘exit’ option may see shareholders simply sell 
their shares and exit the company.  
At the other end of the spectrum from the exit option is the ‘loyalty’ option under 
which shareholders remain docile and hold on to their shares for the long term. However, a 
small group of loyal shareholders may voice their concerns, but they are usually a small 
minority, as most make a rational calculation that any action upon their part will be too 
costly. Thus some bank shareholders may simply have high levels of trust in their banks and 
banks often emphasise the importance of trust for their business. Many people have a high 
degree of trust in their banks, even though they may distrust individual bankers.
6
  
Exclusive resort to the ‘voice’ option may see shareholders seeking to engage with 
directors and senior management of the company to voice corporate governance concerns. As 
we have seen, voice may also be associated with either exit or loyalty decisions. Voice may 
take a variety of forms; one of these is the resort to litigation against the company or its 
officers. However this litigation option encounters another general obstacle in the form of 
                                                          
5
 A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States 
(Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1970). 
6
 P. Sapienza and L. Zingales, ‘Financial Trust Index the Results: Wave IV’ Chicago Booth/Kellogg School, at: 
http://www.financialtrustindex.org/resultswave4.htm; M. Knell and H. Stix, Trust in Banks? Evidence from 
Normal Times and from Times of Crises, (Working Paper 158), Vienna, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, 2009. 
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what Olson referred to as ‘the logic of collective action’.7 Individual rational calculations 
regarding the cost of litigation will dissuade some shareholders from taking action on their 
own unless their costs are significantly lower than those of others. In this context it is 
interesting to note that action against BAE Systems in regard to bribery allegations was taken 
by a public interest group, Corner House, and not by its larger shareholders.
8
 It may be that 
public money would be well spent funding similar public interest actions against banks. 
Reviewing the nature of legal claims that shareholders might make is important in the 
context of the dominance of the director primacy model in managing companies. This model 
promotes maximising shareholder wealth, but leaves all critical business decisions in the 
company to the board and the company’s management. This need not be a bad thing if 
directors are well-qualified and are not subject to constant pressure to achieve short term 
performance goals. These pressures, to a large degree, come from institutional investors 
themselves.
9
 So rather than being seen as the solution, short-term oriented institutional 
investors may actually be part of the problem.  
There are many ways of looking at the roles that are uppermost in the minds of 
shareholders; the approach shareholders take to their role in the company will indicate what 
response can or should be expected of them with regard to the enforcement of their legal 
rights and claims; the particular perspective adopted may not lead to litigation and might 
simply lead to the use of the ‘exit’ option of sale of shares. Thus, insofar as public companies 
                                                          
7
 M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1971). 
8
 See further R (on the Application of Corner House Research Campaign) v Director of the Serious Fraud Office 
and BAE Systems plc [2008] EWHC 714 (Admin). 
9
 See for example L. E. Mitchell, ‘The Board as a Path Toward Corporate Social Responsibility’ in D. 
McBarnet, A. Voiculescu and T. Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social 
Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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are concerned, Jennifer Hill pointed out that there has been a massive movement away from 
the nineteenth century view of shareholders as owners, even if the nexus of contracts view 
points to a principal–agent relationship between shareholders and directors.10  
This saw a move to Berle’s view of shareholders as beneficiaries for whom 
managerial powers were held by directors in trust, but where shareholders were not to 
participate in corporate governance.
11
 With the rise of large corporations this trust-orientated 
view has been discredited by judges in more recent times. Another view of shareholders was 
that of ‘bystanders’ to managerial power in the ascendancy; this view continued into the 
twentieth century. On some occasions, shareholders have been seen as participants in a 
system of private government within the corporation which has seen the advocacy of 
corporate constitutionalism by writers such as Bottomley.
12
  
A variation of the view of the shareholder as bystander is that of shareholders as 
investors who merely contribute capital without wanting to have a role in managing the 
company, as Henry Manne had articulated it.
13
 Yet another version of the shareholder role 
identified by Hill is that of the shareholder as guardian or monitor of managerial decision-
making.  
Finally, Hill points to an emerging and somewhat disturbing image of the institutional 
shareholder as a ‘Managerial Partner’ with management in the task of controlling the 
                                                          
10
 J. Hill, ‘Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder’ (2000) 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 39.  
11
 A.A. Berle, ‘Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust’ (1931) 44 Harvard Law Review 1049. The contrary view 
was expressed by Dodd in M.E. Dodd, ‘For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?’ (1932) 45 Harvard Law 
Review 1145. 
12
 S. Bottomley, ‘From Contractualism to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Corporate Governance’ (1997) 
19 Sydney Law Review 277. 
13
 H. Manne, ‘Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics’ (1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 259 at 260–
261. 
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company’s decision making. Hill notes that this partnership between institutional investors 
and management helps to legitimize managerial power and maximize outcomes for 
shareholders.; The dark side of this phenomenon is that it is occurring at the same time as 
labour interests are being ‘decollectivised’ which has seen a decline in employee wages 
whilst executive remuneration has skyrocketed.
14
  
In such a situation of proximity between institutional shareholders and corporate 
management, the prospects for institutional shareholder litigation against management are 
probably much reduced. This is especially so because the managers of institutional 
investment funds are themselves rewarded in the same way as managers of the companies in 
which they invest. In the US Lawrence Mitchell has noted that: 
 
<quotation>The problem is that institutions had their own short-term pressures. In particular, 
their compensation systems were structured in a manner that rewarded fund managers for 
their quarterly performance. If the institutions – or those who managed them – were to use 
their power for anything, the natural financial incentive would be for them to use their power 
to increase their own compensation. And so they did.
15
</quotation> 
 
It would be surprising if similar tendencies were not evident in the UK. 
 
<a> III. IN THE SHADOW OF THE WALKER REVIEW 
                                                          
14
 See J. Hill, ‘Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder’ (2000) 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 39, 
text around footnotes 171 to 184. 
15
 L. E. Mitchell, ‘The Board as a Path Toward Corporate Social Responsibility’ in D. McBarnet, A. Voiculescu 
and T. Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 301. Also see L. E. Mitchell, Corporate Irresponsibility: 
America’s Newest Export (New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001). 
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One of the findings from official inquiries into the global financial crisis and its effects in the 
UK is that shareholders were remarkably docile during the height of the market euphoria, 
with little if any effort being made by them to constrain banks from their more risky business 
strategies; this applied to small shareholders as well as to larger institutional investors. The 
final report of the Walker Review into corporate governance in UK banks and other financial 
institutions noted that ‘there appears to have been a widespread acquiescence by institutional 
investors and the market in the gearing up of the balance sheet of banks as a means of 
boosting returns on equity’.16 In other words banks were allowed to assume significantly 
increased indebtedness by shareholders who hoped for greater dividends or rises in the value 
of shares. Shareholder greed therefore played a part in explaining their docility. This had the 
effect of aggravating various problems experienced by banks.  
Traditionally, it is believed that shareholders should be able to deal with many of the 
internal problems of the corporation by using internal mechanisms, such as the election and 
dismissal of directors and the passage of resolutions at general meetings. However, these 
tools are not as effective as our legal theory of self-regulating corporations would assume. It 
is therefore left to other market mechanisms, such as price signals and the threat of takeover, 
to challenge directors or to gain their attention in listed companies.  
However the theory that poor corporate governance in a company will lead to a new 
management team seeking to take over the company is often questionable as many other 
                                                          
16
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.10. This can be contrasted with the view that it is not 
reasonable to expect institutional investors to shoulder the bulk of the burden of corporate governance since 
regulators, auditors and professional bodies also have a role to play in the corporate governance of banks and 
other financial companies, see F. Curtiss, I. Levine and J. Browning, ‘The Institutional Investor’s Role in 
Responsible Ownership’ in I. MacNeil and J. O’Brien (eds) The Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2010). 
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reasons usually drive takeover activity (as with the Cadbury takeover by Kraft) and 
companies that have been the subject of a takeover are not necessarily any more efficient and 
often fail. Takeover rules may also constrain shareholders and directors to a large extent.
17
 
Walker approached this problem in terms of failures in the responsibility of 
shareholders as owners; he noted that they would often simply sell their shares if they had 
concerns about the company, and he therefore called for a more effective stewardship role for 
major shareholders. He explained that: 
 
<quotation>As a matter of public interest, a situation in which the influence of major 
shareholders in their companies is principally executed through market transactions in the 
stock cannot be regarded as a satisfactory ownership model, not least given the limited 
liability that shareholders enjoy.
18
</quotation> 
 
In some respects this was a repeat of a call by the Hampel Committee to bring about an 
increased governance role for institutional investors.
19
 Similar efforts were also made in the 
subsequent Myners report.
20
 However, this strategy has not been without its critics.
21
  
                                                          
17
 See generally D. Kershaw, ‘The Illusion of Importance: Reconsidering the UK’s Takeover Defence 
Prohibition’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 267. 
18
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.7. 
19
 R. Hampel, Committee on Corporate Governance, Report of the Committee on Corporate Governance, 
(London, Gee, 1998). 
20
 P. Myners, Institutional Investment in the UK: A Review (London, HM Treasury, 2001). 
21
 See for example R. Webb, M. Beck and R. McKinnon ‘Problems and Limitations of Institutional Investor 
Participation in Corporate Governance’, (2003) 11 Corporate Governance: An International Review 65.  
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Often, fund managers and senior management of companies have been more concerned 
with short-term share prices than with longer term performance of their companies. Walker 
therefore urged that fund managers consider adopting a ‘commitment to a stewardship 
obligation’ where this could be done within the terms of their mandate so as to more 
effectively hold company management to account. As he observed: 
 
<quotation>Some governance by owners is essential, at least in respect of the selection, 
composition and performance of boards, if boards and the executive of listed companies are 
to be appropriately held to account in discharge of their agency role to their principals. 
Shareholders who do not exercise such governance oversight are effectively free-riding on 
the governance efforts of those that do.
22
</quotation> 
 
Not surprisingly, Walker found that the failure of institutional investors to seek to 
engage with management of banks and other financial institutions meant that they had ‘little 
impact in restraining management before the recent crisis phase...’23 He observed generally 
that: 
 
<quotation>Company performance will be influenced, directly or indirectly, actively or 
passively, by the initiatives and decisions that shareholders or their fund management agents 
take or choose not to take.
24
 </quotation> 
                                                          
22
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.8. 
23
 Ibid at para 5.10. 
24
 Ibid at para 5.2. 
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This observation applies as much to internal efforts to engage with management as to 
external efforts, such as the pursuit of litigious strategies, although Walker would no doubt 
frown upon the use of the latter. As already noted, often disgruntled shareholders may simply 
decide to sell their shares if they are unhappy with the way that a company is being managed. 
This might be a ‘blunt’ means of communicating discontent of a major shareholder to the 
board, but it may also be justified by institutional investors in view of the fiduciary duties 
owed by fund managers.
25
 Thus while the exit option is a blunt form of market signalling, it 
is also necessary to examine what internal mechanisms are available to discontented 
shareholders who are prepared to take action of this kind.  
The Walker Report strongly advocates use of the ‘engagement option’ and takes the 
view that such early intervention will save money in the long run.
26
 Walker urged the 
adoption of ideas found in the Code of Responsibility of Institutional Investors (prepared by 
the Institutional Shareholders’ Committee in 2009) and the reissue of these principles, almost 
unchanged, by the Financial Reporting Council as a Stewardship Code. Principle 5 of the 
Code states that ‘Institutional investors should be willing to act collectively with other 
investors where appropriate.’27  
The Stewardship Code also uses the familiar ‘comply or explain’ model; fund managers 
would be required to clearly state on their websites whether they adhered to the Stewardship 
Code, or to some other business model if the Stewardship Code is seen as being too onerous, 
                                                          
25
 ibid at para 5.2; also see generally the discussion in G. Stapledon, ‘Institutional Investors: What are their 
Responsibilities as Shareholders?’ in J. Parkinson, A. Gamble and G. Kelly (eds) The Political Economy of the 
Company (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000). 
26
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.31. 
27
 Financial Reporting Council (FRC), The UK Stewardship Code (July 2010) (the Stewardship Code) at 
Principle 5. 
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and requiring those institutions that are committed to this form of engagement to ‘participate 
in a [FRC] survey to monitor adherence to the Stewardship Code.’28 
The Stewardship Code proposals are relatively modest and, judging on past 
performance with soft law codes, are of doubtful effect. The one area where there are 
prospects for greater activism by institutional investors is in regard to foreign institutions but 
these will not be subject to the Code.
29
 This raises serious questions regarding the potential 
efficacy of the Stewardship Code.
30
 Whilst the UK’s efforts to foster soft law codes of 
conduct made considerable progress in the 1990s and were widely adopted in other parts of 
the world,
31
 the limits of these codes have been increasingly recognised over the last 
decade.
32
 The fact that foreign institutions will not be subject to the Code and the fact that the 
Code is soft law are both potential constraints on shareholder activism. 
Another constraint on shareholder activism is the ‘free rider’ problem. In a country like 
the UK where share ownership is not concentrated among a few shareholders but is instead 
widely dispersed, an activist shareholder incurs substantial costs relative to the size of its 
shareholding while other shareholders share in the rewards without incurring any costs.
33
 As 
                                                          
28
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at Recommendations 18, 19 and 20. 
29
 See further, M. M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
at 118. 
30
 B. R. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 985 at 1017–1023. 
31
 Cheffins has noted that Britain was something of an exporter in so far as Codes were concerned: B. Cheffins, 
‘Corporate Governance Reform: Britain as an Exporter’ at http://ssrn.com/abstract=215950. 
32
 See generally, E Wymeersch, ‘Corporate Governance Codes and Their Implementation’ (2006) at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=931100; for another general study see R. V. Aguilera, and A. Cuervo-Cazurra, ‘Codes 
of Good Governance’ (2009) 17 Corporate Governance: An International Review 376. 
33
 I. MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’, (2010) 5 Capital 
Markets Law Journal 419 at 428. 
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Walker admitted, fund managers may be reluctant to spend their members’ funds on actions 
which may have significant free-rider benefits to those who do not contribute to the cost of 
such action; Walker listed this as the first reason why there was unwillingness among fund 
managers to use resources on enhanced engagement efforts.
34
  
A more significant constraint is that any individual fund manager will have spread their 
funds around a number of firms so that it will by itself not have sufficient shareholdings in 
any one firm to have much influence if it decides to place pressure upon the company 
internally. Fund managers invest in several companies in order to minimise risk, diversify 
income streams for their funds and sometimes to comply with legal requirements, and in so 
doing, generate increased profits for their funds. This means that their holdings in any one 
company are relatively small.
35
 It has, however, been argued that such fragmented share 
ownership poses a major stumbling block to shareholder activism by institutional investors 
and therefore significantly limits the chances of the Stewardship Code being a success.
36
 
Institutional shareholders’ capacity for concerted action is also seriously handicapped 
by, for example, rules regulating the activities of shareholders if they act in concert.
37
 Where 
institutional shareholders hold more than ten per cent of a company’s shares, they face 
regulatory constraints when they seek to collaborate and so cannot easily be involved in 
collective negotiation and engagement efforts with other shareholders without triggering 
                                                          
34
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.16. 
35
 See generally, M M Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) 
at 288–289. 
36
 B. R. Cheffins, ‘The Stewardship Code’s Achilles Heel’ (2010) 73 Modern Law Review 985 at 1020–1023. 
37
 F. Curtiss, I. Levine and J. Browning, ‘The Institutional Investor’s Role in Responsible Ownership’ in I. 
MacNeil and J. O’Brien (eds) The Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) at 309–310. 
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some regulatory (takeover) rules.
38
 Walker saw the need for the introduction of ‘safe harbour’ 
rulings to facilitate such collective actions by shareholders.
39
 Very conveniently, both the 
Takeover Panel and the FSA issued guidance notes to deal with cases such as this.
40
 The 
complexity of these arrangements nevertheless raises further obstacles to effective collective 
action against unresponsive boards.
41
 However, these regulatory constraints do not apply to 
litigation against the company, unless the actions are taken in a takeover context. 
On the other hand, the problems faced by individual small shareholders seeking to take 
action within the company are even greater than those facing larger shareholders. Thus, 
Walker noted that: 
 
<quotation>...individual shareholders acting alone face almost insuperable barriers to 
successful participation in engagement activity, while the costs of gathering information and 
                                                          
38
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.44. 
39
 Ibid at para 5.45. 
40
 The Takeover Panel noted these concerns and issued Practice Note 26 on 9 September 2009 to clarify 
circumstances in which collective initiatives by shareholders would be seen as being ‘control seeking’; see 
further at http://www.takeoverpanel.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2008/11/PS26.pdf. The EU Acquisitions 
Directive (Directive 2007/44/EC) also requires that persons who act in concert notify the FSA where there is an 
intention to acquire more than ten per cent of shares in a company. The FSA has sought to provide some 
flexibility in this regard with guidance (issued on 19 August 2009) as to how it would deal with such activist 
shareholder actions; see further D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other 
Financial Industry Entities: Final Recommendations (26 November 2009) at 152. 
41
 In Annex 7 of his Final Recommendations, Walker referred to the obstacles created by Rule 9 of the Takeover 
Code which seek to regulate collective initiatives by shareholders which may lead to a degree of control over a 
company on an on-going basis: see Walker ibid at 151. 
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co-ordinating large numbers of small investors make it impossible for them to have any 
meaningful impact on governance.
42
  </quotation> 
 
It was for this reason that Walker urged that a new engagement model be adopted by 
institutional shareholders in UK companies. Yet while individual shareholders face 
considerable obstacles to initiating effective litigation against their companies, institutional 
investors are not necessarily in a superior position. Siems points to research showing that 
institutional investors ‘are typically more informed and experienced than private 
investors....[but]...institutional investors are regarded as more risk-averse and conservative 
than other shareholders.’43  
Although institutions may seem to have more resources, they are also subject to their 
mandates and they often usually adopt a short-term or quarterly view of stock prices. As a 
result, they may not be the solution to corporate governance problems that Walker suggests. 
These handicaps also apply to litigious actions that shareholders may contemplate. 
In any event, Walker’s suggested engagement between institutional shareholders and 
their companies is a somewhat benign form of interaction. For example, one form of 
institutional activism in the use of voting powers occurs in narrow and somewhat contentious 
circumstances, such as the appointment and remuneration of directors, board composition and 
strategic issues affecting the rights of shareholders.
44
 Walker however cautions against 
institutional shareholders organising negative votes against management proposals because of 
                                                          
42
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.16. 
43
 M. M. Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008) at 118. 
44
 See further C. Mallin, ‘Institutional Investors: The Vote as a Tool of Governance’ (2010) Journal of 
Management and Governance 1. 
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the ‘potential embarrassment and tension that may surround negative voting’.45 Surely this 
should not be the criterion which influences the way in which institutional investors exercise 
their duties as shareholders.  
It is interesting to contrast this attitude with the approach taken by a number of 
institutional investors when News Corporation sought to relocate to Delaware and to 
strengthen managerial power vis-a-vis shareholders; in that situation a group of institutional 
investors commenced legal proceedings against News Corporation in the Delaware courts.
46
  
But for Walker a negative vote should only be used ‘as a last resort’.47 This cautious 
attitude mirrors previous practices by institutions as the situations in which they were likely 
to take such negative action before the financial crisis were relatively rare, and one doubts 
that a rebranded Stewardship Code will be likely to lead to more strident action on the part of 
fund managers.
48
 Walker acknowledges that: 
 
<quotation>The limited institutional efforts at engagement with several UK banks appear to 
have had little impact in restraining management before the recent crisis phase, and it is 
                                                          
45
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.48. 
46
 See further UniSuper Ltd v News Corporation (2005) WL 3529317 (Del Ch)); this case is discussed at length 
in J. Hill, ‘The Shifting Balance of Power between Shareholders and the Board: News Corp’s Exodus to 
Delaware and Other Antipodean Tales’ Sydney Law School Research Paper No. 08/20 at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1086477; J. Hill, ‘Subverting Shareholder Rights: Lessons from News Corp’s 
Migration to Delaware’ (2010) 63 Vanderbilt Law Review 1. 
47
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 5.49. 
48
 I. MacNeil, ‘Activism and Collaboration Among Shareholders in UK Listed Companies’ (2010) 5 Capital 
Markets Law Journal 419. 
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noteworthy that levels of voting against bank resolutions rarely exceeded 10 per 
cent.
49
</quotation> 
 
If this continues to be the case we will need to look outside the corporation to see if 
more effective intervention might be available in the event of failure of internal 
mechanisms.
50
 However apart from resort to the FRC’s Codes, Walker appeared reluctant to 
urge greater legalisation of corporate governance responses. As his report noted: 
 
<quotation>The implicit preference embedded in the current UK corporate governance model 
is to focus principal attention on key matters such as the qualities of directors, the functioning 
of boards and appropriate incentive structures, with primary legislation and black letter 
regulation reserved for a limited array of prescriptive rules related to explicit obligations 
relating to disclosure and fiduciary duties.
51
 </quotation> 
 
The strong conservative message that is implicit in the approach adopted by Walker is 
consistent with his background as a banker and helps to explain the support that his report has 
                                                          
49
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at 5.10. 
50
 The EU Commission announced in June 2010 that it intended to undertake a corporate governance review 
which would include an examination of institutional investors’ adherence to ‘stewardship codes’ of best 
practice’: see EU Commission, Green Paper on Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions and 
Remuneration Policies (COM(2010) 285) (June 2010) at 
http://ec.europe.eu/internal_market/company/docs/modern/com2010_284_en.pdf. It is obviously too soon to 
know what these outcomes will be, but these stewardship ideas are not new. 
51
 D. Walker, A Review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry Entities: Final 
Recommendations (26 November 2009) at para 1.17. 
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received from successive UK governments. He preferred to see improvements made to 
strengthen ‘an overall culture of good governance’ and opposed any resort to refining 
provisions of the Companies Act 2006 as being likely to undermine this culture and introduce 
a legalistic culture.
52
 In these circumstances Walker warned of the dangers of litigation if his 
preferred model was not followed and he argued that: 
 
<quotation>Migration from this model to a wider statutory approach would have 
profound implications, including not least the possibility that it would increase the 
vulnerability of boards to litigation.
53
</quotation> 
 
He therefore emphasised that new legislation or regulations should not be pursued as 
these ‘...may have little or no comparative advantage or relevance’ when seen in the context 
of ‘the powerful influence exerted by the FSA Handbook and the Combined Code process.’54 
This was of course a very narrow view as it ignores the fact that both kinds of approaches are 
required if there is to be adequate accountability.
55
 It also ignores the vast body of academic 
research literature on litigation that emphasises the value of ‘bargaining in the shadow of the 
law’ and which sees it as a powerful tool; most cases of such bargaining do not lead to cases 
getting into the courtroom. But Walker effectively rejected the use of legal rules and 
                                                          
52
 Ibid at para 2.23. 
53
 Ibid at para 1.18. 
54
 Ibid at para 1.20. 
55
 See generally: D. McBarnet, A. Voiculescu, and T. Campbell (eds), The New Corporate Accountability: 
Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007); also see J. 
Braithwaite, Regulatory Capitalism: How it Works, Ideas for Making it Work Better (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar, 2008). 
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litigation and instead placed a high degree of faith in informal codes and the somewhat erratic 
comply or explain approach to corporate governance that has been adopted.
56
 
Walker’s championing of institutional investor engagement as the primary method of 
securing improved corporate governance and accountability largely ignores the counter-
tendency that is so often discussed in the corporate law literature, namely, the rise of 
powerful boards and chief executives, or what has come to be accepted as the Director 
Primacy model of the corporation.
57
 Under this ‘nexus of contracts’ inspired model the 
participation rights of shareholders are limited, but re-emerge in the form of the stated 
commitment of directors to seek to maximize shareholder welfare. In this way, shareholders 
are seen as beneficiaries, but are expected to remain on the sidelines or as ‘bystanders’.58 The 
managerial powers given to directors and the operation of the ‘business judgement’ rule 
makes it very difficult for shareholders to effectively challenge the dominance of directors in 
company decision making.
59
 Our last line of defence in the UK seems to be the introduction 
of ‘enlightened shareholder value’ policies.60 This approach offers the potential to be 
successful but whether or not it will ultimately be successful remains to be seen. 
                                                          
56
 This is not the place to engage in a more detailed discussion of the reliability of Codes like the UK Code of 
Corporate Governance. 
57
 See further S. Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment’ (2006) 119 Harvard Law 
Review 1735. Also see S. Bainbridge, The New Corporate Governance in Theory and Practice (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2008). 
58
 J. Hill, ‘Visions and Revisions of the Shareholder’ (2000) 48 American Journal of Comparative Law 39, 
especially references at footnote 152. 
59
 See however A. Keay, ‘Company Directors Behaving Poorly: Disciplinary Options for Shareholders’ (2007) 
Journal of Business Law 656 and J. Hill, ‘The Rising Tension Between Shareholders and Director Power in the 
Common Law World’ (2010) 18 Corporate Governance: An International Review 344. 
60
 See generally S. Kairie, ‘At the Crossroads: Shareholder Value, Stakeholders and Enlightened Shareholder 
Value: Which Road Should the UK Take?’ (2006) 17 International Company and Commercial Law Review 329. 
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So where are we to go from here? The above discussion of the potential for shareholder 
activism within the corporation helps to identify the constraints that may be placed upon 
shareholder activism were it to be expressed in the form of litigation against the company or 
its officers; one can only suspect that there would not be much enthusiasm amongst 
institutions for this given the difficulties of generating action within the company itself.  
The financial press has long played a significant role in shining light upon corporate 
governance failures. A good example of this is the criticism in the financial press of Sir Stuart 
Rose’s continued role as Chairman at Marks and Spencer after his service as CEO. But 
despite its value, the press has its limits in monitoring the complex internal affairs of large 
listed companies.  
Another means of external action is the use of more strident regulatory techniques, such 
as the FSA’s fines on Northern Rock officers for actions taken in selling products prior to the 
onset of the crisis. A more active regulator is much to be welcomed, after the FSA’s 
unsatisfactory experience with light-touch regulation.
61
 This strident regulatory approach 
would apply especially in regard to regulated financial institutions, but the funding resources 
available to regulators for litigation are limited and sometimes need to be supplemented by 
government in high profile cases.
62
 
                                                          
61
 See generally R. Tomasic, ‘Beyond “Light Touch” Regulation of British Banks after the Financial Crisis’ in I. 
MacNeil and J. O’Brien (eds), The Future of Financial Regulation (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010). 
62
 For example, in the largest corporate prosecution in Australia following the collapse of the insurance 
company HIH, the Commonwealth Government made special allocations of funds to the Australian Securities 
Investments Commission (ASIC). Additional funds were also allocated to ASIC to fund high profile corporate 
prosecutions against James Hardy, OneTel and Offset Alpine. The preparedness of governments to fund 
unexpected corporate actions of this kind is essential if regulators are to be effective. See further Parliament of 
Australia, Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services, Statutory Oversight of the Australian 
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This leaves resort to the courts by shareholders. However as we have seen the courts are 
reluctant to deal with corporate matters until all internal avenues have been exhausted by 
litigants. This perhaps explains why so many cases have been brought by liquidators after the 
failure of companies. Shareholder actions, such as litigation, involve significant costs and 
have uncertain outcomes. There are also the wider collective action problems in widely held 
companies which discourage disparate smaller shareholders from organising themselves in 
order to challenge entrenched management teams, either through internal processes of the 
company, such as the general meeting, or through external processes, such as resort to the 
courts. 
 
<a> IV. AN OVERVIEW OF SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES SINCE 2000  
 
It is interesting to undertake a somewhat limited analysis of the contours of company 
litigation under the UK Companies Act over the last decade. Using the Westlaw internet 
database, cases from 2000 to 2010 which were concerned with shareholders were examined. 
Excluded from the count were Scottish cases, European Court of Justice cases and Privy 
Council cases. A total of 115 relevant cases were revealed in this search; of these, 107 cases 
(or 93 per cent) were brought by individual shareholders and eight cases (or 6.9 per cent) 
were brought by institutions. 
It is notable that litigation rarely concerns public companies; thus, over this period, 
92.2 per cent of cases (106 cases) concerned a private limited company, one case involved a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Securities and Investments Commission (May 2005), Ch 2 at: 
http://aph.gov.au/senate/committee/corporations_ctte/asic/asic_05/c02.hym at paras 2.32 to 2.40. 
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foreign corporation whilst the remainder (eight cases or 6.9 per cent) concerned a UK public 
limited company. A total of 59.1 per cent (or 68 cases) were successful.
63
 
The basis of the claims made in these company related cases varied, with the most 
common grounds involving claims of unfair prejudice (32.2 per cent) and membership or 
share related issues (24.3 per cent); these two areas covered more than half of all claims 
made. Also, some 14.8 per cent of cases involved shareholders’ agreements; derivative 
claims arose in eight (or 6.9 per cent) of cases. Table 5.1 sets out these claims. 
 
Table 5.1 Type of legal claims litigated in England and Wales since 1 January 2000 
 
Type of legal claim Number of cases Percentage of total cases 
 
Unfair prejudice (s.994 and old 
s.459) 
Membership or share issue 
Shareholder agreements 
Derivative claims 
Human rights or judicial review 
Other claims 
 
 
37 
 
28 
17 
8 
2 
23 
 
32.2 
 
24.3 
14.8 
7.0 
1.7 
20.0 
 
TOTAL cases 115 100 
                                                          
63
 It might be argued that this pattern reflects what McQueen has described as the ‘colonisation’ of UK company 
law by partnerships and small firms in the late nineteenth century, so that company law mainly serves the needs 
of smaller companies: see further, R. McQueen, A Social History of Company Law: Great Britain and the 
Australian Colonies 1854–1920 (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing, 2009). 
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Of the above 115 cases (there were 153 defendants in total), fewer than half of the 
total defendants were shareholders (43.8 per cent), although 12.4 per cent of defendants were 
both shareholders and directors. Companies constituted 29.4 per cent of defendants. 
Most cases involved solvent companies (88.7 per cent or 102 cases) and most were 
applications or first instance petitions (74.7 per cent), and 25 cases (or 21.7 per cent) were on 
appeal; four cases involved preliminary issues. 
Unfair prejudice cases: A total of 37 unfair prejudice cases were brought either 
under the new s.994 of the Companies Act 2006 (10 cases) or under s.459 of the Companies 
Act 1985 (27 cases). Only two of these cases involved public companies.
64
  
Shareholders were involved in a large proportion of these cases, with 43.3 per cent (or 
23 cases) of defendants being shareholders; a third of defendants were companies (33.9 per 
cent) and eight directors (15 per cent) were defendants. 
Membership or share issue cases: All of the membership or share issue cases 
involved private companies, with 96.4 per cent of these cases (or 27 cases) being brought by 
an individual; most of these cases were brought against other shareholders (52.9 per cent and 
six defendants were shareholders/directors (17.6 per cent of defendants). The issues arising in 
these membership or share related claims are set out in Table 5.2 (below). 
Shareholder agreement cases: Of the less than 15 per cent of cases (17) involving 
shareholder agreements, only one case concerned a public company,
65
 and institutional 
                                                          
64
 Rock (Nominees) Ltd v RCO (Holdings) plc (in members’ voluntary liquidation) [2004] EWCA Civ 118; 
[2004] BCC 466, in which case the alleged unfair prejudice in breach of s.459 was not substantiated; and CAS 
(Nominees) Ltd v Nottingham Forest FC plc [2002] BCC 145 in which case the alleged breach of s.459 was 
dismissed.5. 
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shareholders were involved in making two claims, with the remaining claims being made by 
individuals. Of the 17 claims, 13 were successful (76.4 per cent), suggesting that the courts 
are more relaxed in dealing with these claims than with derivative actions (see below). 
Derivative actions: Of the eight derivative action claims, only one of these involved a 
public company.
66
 Seven cases involved individual shareholders with the remaining case 
being brought by an institutional shareholder. Of these cases, 37.5per cent were successful, 
25 per cent were adjourned and 37.5 per cent failed. Seven companies comprised defendants 
(or 46.6 per cent of defendants), with directors forming 2 per cent of defendants (or three 
defendants); the remaining defendants were shareholders (20 per cent) and 
shareholders/directors (13.3 per cent). These figures reflect a wider critique of the limited 
utility of derivative action proceedings.
67
 
Human rights cases: This category is particularly interesting, bearing in mind the 
fact that there has been a rise in human rights cases concerning company-related matters. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
65
 See further Holt v Faulks [2001] BCC 50; [2000] 2 BCLC 816. In this case a shareholder applied to the court 
to implement a clause in a shareholder agreement and sought summary judgment against a company’s former 
executive director seeking a transfer notice for his shares in the company. 
66
 See further Harley Street Capital Ltd v Tchigirinsky (No 2) [2005] EWHC 1897 (Ch); [2006] BCC 209. The 
court refused the application that involved claims of breaches of fiduciary duty and a dilution of the fourth 
defendant company’s interest in a joint venture. A freezing injunction was discharged. 
67
 See generally A. Reisberg, ‘Derivative Claims under the Companies Act 2006: Much Ado About Nothing?’ in 
J. Armour and J. Payne (eds), Rationality in Common Law: Essays in Honour of DD Prentice (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2009). Also see A. Keay and J. Loughrey, ‘Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed: 
An Analysis of the New Derivative Action under the Companies Act 2006’ (2008) 124 Law Quarterly Review 
469. 
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There were two human rights and judicial review cases initiated by shareholders during the 
period since 2000, both involving public companies.
68
  
Both cases were defended by a government agency. The first case involved the 
Treasury Commissioner and arose in relation to the claims by former Northern Rock plc 
(Northern Rock) shareholders who challenged the basis upon which they had been 
compensated when Northern Rock had been nationalized. In the other case, shareholders in 
the Railtrack group brought an action against the Secretary of State for Transport claiming 
misfeasance by the Secretary for his plan to place the company into administration on the 
grounds of insolvency.  
In both cases, the key ground relied upon by the shareholders was the claim that their 
property rights had been infringed in contravention of human rights provisions. It seems that 
all possible company law causes of action were found wanting. In the case involving 
Railtrack it was argued that the proposed plan infringed Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights contained in the Human Rights Act 1998 Schedule 1 
Part II Article 1. The case involving Northern Rock shareholders also involved claims that 
there had been a contravention of Article 1 of Protocol 1 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights. The Northern Rock case will be discussed more fully in the next section. 
Other cases: Of the remaining 23 cases (20 per cent of all cases), two involved public 
companies,
69
 20 cases concerned UK private companies and one case concerned a company 
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 See further R (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) v Commissioners of HM Treasury [2009] 
EWCA Civ 788; [2010] BCC 558 and Weir v Secretary of State for Transport (No 2) [2005] EWHC 2192 (Ch). 
69
 See further Hall v Cable and Wireless plc [2009] EWHC 1793 (Comm); [2011] BCC 543. In this case the 
shareholders claimed that the company had wrongfully failed to disclose material information to the market 
thereby causing loss to the shareholders. In finding for the company the court held that the defendants did not 
have a cause of action for breach of the listing rules or for the alleged market abuse. The second case was 
Thakrar v Ciro Citterio Menswear plc (in administration) [2002] EWHC 1975 (Ch) in which the claimant 
217 
 
that was not incorporated in the UK. Of these 23 cases, 15 involved solvent companies; four 
were insolvent, two were under administration, one had ceased trading and one was in 
receivership.  
One case involved an institutional shareholder and all other cases involved individual 
shareholders. Table 5.3 sets out the types of claims made in each of these cases, showing that 
the first three categories of case, winding up cases, cases involving procedural issues and 
administration proceedings, comprised 52.1 per cent of cases. 
 
Table 5.2 Membership or share-related claims in England and Wales since 1 January 2000 
 
Type of legal claim Number of cases (out of 
28) 
Percentage of total 
membership or 
share cases 
 
Share transfer, sale, purchase or 
acquisition of shares 
Meeting, resolution, articles of 
association claim 
Valuation claim 
Register of members issue 
Entitlement to shares issue 
Entitlement to funds or assets issue 
Board of directors issue 
 
11 
 
3 
 
3 
3 
5 
2 
1 
 
39.2 
 
10.7 
 
10.7 
10.7 
17.8 
7.1 
3.6 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
sought a declaration that the defendant company was bound by the terms of a settlement agreement. The court 
found in favour of the claimant ordering specific performance of the agreement. 
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Table 5.2 shows that out of the 28 membership or share related claims, 11 (39 per 
cent) of them related to share transfers, sales, purchases or the acquisition of shares. This 
represents by far the largest cause of action for membership or share related claims. 
Interestingly only one claim (3.6 per cent) concerned an issue relating to the board of 
directors, suggesting that shareholders are perhaps more interested in their own personal 
interests as shareholders rather than their responsibilities, as owners, to hold directors to 
account. 
 
Table 5.3 Types of legal claims made in the residual category of 23 cases 
Type of legal claim Number of cases (out of 23) Percentage of total 
cases 
 
Winding up proceedings  
Procedural issues 
Administration proceedings 
Breach of agreement/deed 
Negligence 
Breach of Listing Rules 
Deprivation of assets issue 
Breach of fiduciary duty  
Disqualification 
Fraud 
 
5 
5 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
 
21.7 
21.7 
8.7 
8.7 
8.7 
4.3 
4.3 
4.3 
4.3 
4.3 
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Misapplication of assets 
Deceit 
 
1 
1 
4.3 
4.3 
 
The residual category of ‘other claims’ reported in Table 5.3 shows that winding up 
proceedings, administration proceedings and procedural issues comprise over half of the 
remaining cases. The remainder deal with a variety of legal breaches. The numbers are too 
small to allow for any generalisations to be made about them.  
 
[a] V. THE NORTHERN ROCK PLC SHAREHOLDER APPEAL
70
 
 
When the House of Commons Treasury Committee undertook its inquiry into the failure of 
Northern Rock, it focused attention primarily on the business model used by the bank and the 
conduct of its regulators and directors. It did not delve too deeply into the position of the 
Northern Rock shareholders, although it did take a fairly negative view as to their prospects 
when it observed that: 
 
<quotation>It is unfortunate that the shareholders who acquired their shares as part of 
demutualisation and the staff of Northern Rock have suffered significantly from the fall in the 
value of Northern Rock shares. However, it is not possible to make a distinction between 
types of shareholders in the circumstances of Northern Rock. In a market environment, 
                                                          
70
 The following section draws upon R. Tomasic, ‘Shareholder Litigation and the Financial Crisis: The Northern 
Rock Shareholder Appeal Considered’ (2009) 262 Company Law Newsletter, October 29 2009, at 1–5. 
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shareholders as a whole must be viewed as taking a risk from which they sought a reward and 
for which they are now paying a price.
71
</quotation> 
 
This would not have been a comforting observation for the shareholders. The decision of 
the Court of Appeal in the appeal by Northern Rock shareholders following the 
nationalisation of Northern Rock and the subsequent compulsory acquisition of their shares is 
an important statement of the role of legal mechanisms in periods of major financial crises. 
The Court’s rejection of the appeal in R (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) 
v Commissioners of HM Treasury 
72
 identified key drivers of the legal response and 
highlighted the relatively weak position of shareholders of banks, such as Northern Rock, that 
failed during the global financial crisis. 
These key drivers included the legislative framework which was put in place by the UK 
Parliament following the passage of the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008. This hastily 
passed enactment laid down the assumptions that should be followed by the Treasury - 
appointed independent valuer when deciding on the amount of compensation that should be 
paid to former shareholders of nationalized banks.
73
 In the end this meant that the resolution 
of the appeal largely became a matter of statutory interpretation. Also driving the legal 
response was the knowledge of central banks which act as lenders of last resort (LOLR) in 
times of crisis. The Court of Appeal was to turn to this body of economically-inspired 
principles to provide the basis for its decision when it accepted the importance of this body of 
thought, as expressed by the former Governor of the Bank of England Lord Eddie George. 
                                                          
71
 The House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock (HC 56-1) (January 2008) at 20–21.  
72
 [2009] EWCA Civ 788; [2010] BCC 558. 
73
 See further R. Tomasic, ‘The Rescue of Northern Rock: Nationalisation in the Shadow of Insolvency’ (2008) 
1(4) Corporate Rescue and Insolvency 109. 
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Reference was made by Lord George to earlier statements regarding the LOLR that had 
been made by Walter Bagehot following the collapse and subsequent run on Overend, 
Gurney & Co in 1866. A 1993 speech delivered by Lord George served to set out the 
principles that the Court of Appeal regarded as fundamental in this case. In doing so, the 
Court of Appeal was prepared to recognise the importance of economic concepts such as 
‘moral hazard’ as providing a basis for the policy that had been adopted by the Bank of 
England and the UK government.
74
  
Another notable feature of this appeal is that the principal legal foundations of the 
shareholders’ action were not found in insolvency law or in company law principles, but in 
the application of European human rights law concepts as developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights. In particular, the decision of the Court of Appeal rested on the 
interpretation of Article 1 of the First Protocol (A1P1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights which guarantees the protection of private property.
75
 The case law under this 
provision developed the principles to be applied in the payment of compensation following 
                                                          
74
 Moral hazard in banking refers to the tendency of banks to take on more risk by, for example increasing 
leverage or investing in riskier assets, at the expense of the public safety net: see T. Padoa-Schioppa, Regulating 
Finance: Balancing Freedom and Risk (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2004) at 99. Interestingly, 
governments were prepared to ignore this constraint when they offered financial assistance to failing firms as 
the concept of moral hazard was seen as less important than maintaining the stability of the banking system.  
75
 Article 1 provides: ‘Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No 
one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for 
by law and by the general principles of international law. The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any 
way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.’ 
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the compulsory acquisition of property by the State.
76
 This meant that little room remained 
for the application to this case, by way of analogy or otherwise, of commercial law principles 
from other areas, such as the law of salvage and principles of unjust enrichment.
77
  
 
<b> a) Legal and Economic Background Factors 
 
In August 2007 Northern Rock experienced difficulties in sourcing funds to support its 
lending; it had grown rapidly to become the fifth largest UK mortgage lender, but relied upon 
an unsustainable business model that depended upon the continued availability of short term 
funds. The collapse of the sub-prime mortgage bubble in the US had a direct effect upon the 
ability of the bank to continue to operate.
78
  
The failure of Northern Rock is notable in that it was seen as potentially jeopardising 
the stability of the entire UK financial system. News that the company had sought financial 
support from the Bank of England led to a run on the bank after 13 September 2007. 
Thereafter the Chancellor of the Exchequer authorized the Bank of England to provide 
emergency support as lender of last resort (LOLR).  
This support was aimed at injecting stability and confidence into the banking system 
and the Chancellor also sought to guarantee deposits to quell the bank run. This eventually 
                                                          
76
 See further T. Allen, Property and the Human Rights Act 1998 (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2005); also see 
generally R. P. Malloy, Private Property, Community Development and Eminent Domain (Farnham, Ashgate, 
2008). 
77
 R (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) v Commissioners of HM Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 
788; [2010] BCC 558 [2009] EWCA Civ 788; [2010] BCC 558 at [64–66]. 
78
 See further R. Tomasic, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk-taking in Northern Rock: Part 1’ (2008) 
Company Lawyer (2008) 297 and R. Tomasic, ‘Corporate Rescue, Governance and Risk-taking in Northern 
Rock: Part 2’ (2008) 29 Company Lawyer 330. 
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led the Bank of England to lend some £27 billion to Northern Rock. This temporary relief 
was primarily aimed at stabilising the UK banking system and avoiding contagion. 
Nationalisation became necessary as a suitable private sector solution had not been 
forthcoming. Nationalisation took place immediately after the passage of special legislation, 
the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008, on 21 February 2008; this enactment was 
replaced a year later by the Banking Act 2009.
79
 
The Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 allowed for the making of compensation 
orders on designated terms. Critically, s.5(4) of this Act required an independent valuer, 
when making a valuation, to assume that ‘all financial assistance provided by the Bank of 
England or the Treasury to the deposit-taker in question has been withdrawn...’ and that ‘no 
financial assistance would in future be provided by the Bank of England or the Treasury to 
the deposit-taker....’80  
Furthermore, the Northern Rock Plc Compensation Scheme Order 2008 (made under 
s.5 of the 2008 Act) provided that the amount of compensation that would be payable would 
be ‘an amount equal to the value immediately before the transfer time of all shares in 
Northern Rock’81 and that the valuer must assume that Northern Rock was ‘unable to 
continue as a going concern’ and that it was in administration.82 
The case brought by the Northern Rock shareholders was first heard by Burton LJ and 
Silber J in the Queen’s Bench Division, who handed down their judgment on 13 February 
                                                          
79
 See further R. Tomasic, ‘Creating a Template for Banking Insolvency Law Reform After the Collapse of 
Northern Rock: Part 1’ (2009) 22(5) Insolvency Intelligence 65 and R. Tomasic, ‘Creating a Template for 
Banking Insolvency Law Reform After the Collapse of Northern Rock: Part 2’ (2009) 22(5) Insolvency 
Intelligence 81. 
80
 Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 s.5(4). 
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 Northern Rock plc Compensation Scheme Order 2008 (SI 2008/718) Sch 1 Part 2 para 3. 
82
 Ibid para 6. 
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2009 in R (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) v Commissioners of HM 
Treasury.
83
 The appeal was heard in June 2009 and the decision handed down on 28 July 
2009.
84
 Laws LJ, with whom the Master of the Rolls and Waller LJ agreed, delivered the 
judgment dismissing the appeal. 
The shareholders bringing the appeal comprised two hedge funds (SRM and RAB) 
that respectively held 11.5 per cent and 8.18per cent of the shares in Northern Rock, although 
these shares had been acquired after the Government announced that it would provide 
financial assistance to the bank. Perhaps this was the last gasp of hedge fund activism.
85
 The 
remaining party bringing the action represented small shareholders: there were some 150,000 
small shareholders at the date of the nationalisation. It is interesting to note that prior to 
September 2007 institutional investors had been docile and largely content to allow bank 
boards to engage in highly risky business strategies of the kind pursued by Northern Rock, 
Halifax Bank of Scotland plc (HBOS) and the Royal Bank of Scotland plc (RBS). 
The Bank of England, the FSA and the Treasury, known as the Tripartite Authorities, 
had previously entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) regarding their 
respective roles in a situation of crisis. This MOU included the Bank’s role as LOLR aimed 
primarily at reducing ‘the risk of a serious problem causing wider financial or economic 
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 [2009] EWHC 277 (Admin); [2009] BCC 251. 
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 R (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) v Commissioners of HM Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 
788; [2010] BCC 558. 
85
 See further J. Armour and B.R. Cheffins, ‘The Rise and Fall (?) of Shareholder Activism by Hedge Funds’, 
ECGI – Law Working Paper No 136/2009. Also see A. Klein and E. Zur, ‘Entrepreneurial Shareholder 
Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors’ (2009) 64 Journal of Finance 187. 
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disruption’ so as to ‘minimise both moral hazard in the private sector and financial risk to the 
taxpayer....’86  
The Court of Appeal noted that the ‘precise purpose of LOLR, and the conditions 
under which it may be made available, are of great importance for the issues in this appeal’.87 
The court went on to quote at length from a speech by Lord George in which he explained the 
nature of the LOLR function of seeking to protect the system from ‘contagion’ and the 
principles that the Bank applied in exercising this function. The court quoted Lord George’s 
statements that:  
 
<quotation>Our support, whatever form it takes, is directed to safeguarding the 
financial system....Beyond that, there are various rules we apply. First, we will explore every 
option for a commercial solution before committing our own funds....Second, central banks 
are not in the business of providing public subsidy to private shareholders. If we do provide 
support, we will try to structure it so that any losses fall first on the shareholders and any 
benefits come first to us....Third, we aim to provide liquidity: we will not, in normal 
circumstances, support a bank that we know at the time to be insolvent....Fourth, we look for 
a clear exit....
 88
</quotation> 
 
Lord George had also noted that in order to avoid ‘moral hazard’ (or the expectation 
that banks will be rescued when they act recklessly) when liquidity support is provided under 
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 Memorandum of Understanding between the Bank of England, the Financial Services Authority and HM 
Treasury at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/financialstability/mou.pdf at para 15. 
87
 R (on the application of SRM Global Master Fund LP) v Commissioners of HM Treasury [2009] EWCA Civ 
788; [2010] BCC 558 at [6]. 
88
 Ibid at [8]. 
226 
 
a LOLR facility, the support is provided ‘on terms that are as penal as we can make them’.89 
As the Court of Appeal summarised this central bank instrument: ‘[t]he constraints and 
conditions described by Lord George – last resort, selectivity, unpredictability, no comfort for 
the shareholders, clear exit – are all fashioned, in part at least, to avoid the hazard’.90  
The Court of Appeal found that these principles were applied to the handling of 
Northern Rock. In doing so it rejected the view that the Bank of England was seeking to 
profit from its intervention in Northern Rock; indeed, financial modelling conducted for the 
government by its external advisers cast doubt upon any such profit being forthcoming.
91
  
 
<b> b) Legal Issues before the Court of Appeal 
 
One major and two minor legal issues dominated argument by the appellants before the Court 
of Appeal. The principal issue argued by the appellants was that they had been deprived of 
their shares for little or nothing as a result of the assumptions that had been imposed on the 
valuer by the Parliament. It was argued (by Lord Pannick QC) that this was in conflict with 
the property rights of the shareholders under A1P1 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. 
It was also argued that the Government was well rewarded for the financial assistance 
that it had provided to Northern Rock. In response, it was argued (by Jonathan Sumption QC) 
that the aim of the Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 was quite clear in seeking to put 
the shareholders in the same position that they would have occupied if Northern Rock had not 
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received financial support from Government; in other words, that the business was worthless 
without Government support.  
In finding in favour of the respondents, the Court of Appeal identified three governing 
principles that had emerged out of the European case law on the protection of property rights 
under A1P1 of the Convention. These three key principles were: ‘(1) the need for a fair 
balance to be struck between public interest and private rights; (2) the principle of 
proportionality; (3) the doctrine of margin of appreciation’.92  
According to Laws LJ, the first principle requiring that a balance be struck between 
the public interest and private rights is the overarching principle. The next two principles 
provide the means by which such a balance is to be struck.
93
 As for the second principle, 
proportionality ‘allows for controlled intrusions into a right in question in pursuance of a 
legitimate aim; but in every case the intrusion must be proportionate to the aim’.94As earlier 
European cases have shown, there must be a ‘reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim to be realised.
95
 This would apply to the 
compensation terms that were offered and would ordinarily require the payment of an amount 
reasonably related to the value of the property taken.
96
  
However these first two principles must be read with the third principle, that of the 
‘margin of appreciation’. This doctrine had previously been summarised by Lord Hope of 
Craighead in R v DPP ex parte Kebilene 
97
 and had been applied in James v UK,
98
 which 
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gave it a very broad meaning. It assumes that national governments are in the best position to 
evaluate local needs and conditions and implies that the balance between the private interest 
and the public interest will not be uniformly struck across every case. As the Court of Appeal 
stated, for example, citing Lithgow v UK,
99
 nationalisation is quite different from a 
compulsory purchase order given the complexity of nationalisation and its objectives, and the 
standard of compensation payable may differ.
100
 Any application of the margin of 
appreciation doctrine under the European Convention on Human Rights will be driven by a 
democratic imperative. As a result, the judiciary will defer to the opinion of the elected 
legislature and only interfere with its decision as to nationalisation and the level of 
compensation payable if the judiciary concluded that the State’s judgment was manifestly 
unreasonable.
101
 The Court of Appeal accepted that this would lead one to ask whether the 
assumptions in s.5(4) of the 2008 Act were ‘manifestly without reasonable foundation?’102  
As to this the court held that the assumptions in the legislation regarding the making 
of compensation orders were reasonable. It found that the assumptions put the shareholders in 
the position they would have occupied had no LOLR support been provided.
103
 It concluded: 
 
<quotation>If the shareholders had received more favourable treatment than was furnished by 
these arrangements, the LOLR operation would...have been the source of a specific benefit 
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conferred on them. That would not be consistent with a governing principle of LOLR, namely 
its deployment only in the interest of the financial system as a whole.
104
</quotation> 
 
The court rejected arguments that the rescue involved no risk to the Government and 
that it was motivated by the desire for profit.
105
 It accepted testimony from a senior 
Government official (Kingman) and from the Government’s advisers (Goldman Sachs) that 
these were not the motives behind the rescue.
106
 It was seen to be particularly telling that no 
private sector party was prepared to come to the assistance of Northern Rock, illustrating the 
level of perceived risk that the Government was assuming in this rescue.
107
 The court also 
rejected arguments to the effect firstly that the FSA (and the Bank of England) had a duty to 
protect Northern Rock shareholders
108
 and secondly that there was a failure to provide 
procedural safeguards to protect A1P1 rights, finding that the availability of judicial review 
provided such a safeguard. 
The Court of Appeal adopted the view expressed in the court below that the primary 
responsibility for the insolvency of Northern Rock lay with its management, and that its 
management was answerable to its shareholders, who could ultimately have removed the 
directors.
109
 Yet under normal circumstances the directors of Northern Rock would not have 
owed a legal duty to their shareholders - their duty was to the company. The inadequate state 
of the law on the duties of directors meant that little joy could be had from shareholder 
actions (whether derivative suits or otherwise) against the directors of Northern Rock. This 
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meant that a human rights claim was something of a last resort for the appellants.
110
 Overall 
the outcome of the Northern Rock shareholder appeal illustrates the limited scope that bank 
shareholders have in seeking to rely upon normal company law remedies and other avenues 
of redress in banking crises. 
 
<a> VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This chapter has sought to deal with an area of some concern to company law scholars, 
namely, the extent to which company law is actually enforced. The traditional Holmesian 
view would see law as an expression of what courts do.
111
 This is certainly a prevailing 
American and Realist view, although it is less prevalent in the UK with its long tradition of 
laissez faire approaches to company law. 
In more recent times, the emergence of institutional investors as powerful parts of the 
corporate landscape has raised questions about their capacity to contribute more to corporate 
governance and to monitor and even control aberrant management. For the last two decades 
the UK has sought to use soft law as a means of dealing with managerial conduct, despite the 
legislative codification and extension of common law rules regarding the duties of directors 
of UK companies. The Walker Review has been embraced by government representatives in 
the UK and as such we are likely to see a continuation of a voluntary soft law approach, even 
though its effectiveness may be questioned. 
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The presence of some company law litigation maintains the myth that the courts have 
a role to play in the enforcement of company law. To a certain extent the enforcement of 
company law does take place through the involvement of lawyers and the advice that they 
give to their clients. Lawyers have, however, also shaped company law in such a way that the 
prospects for successful litigation against directors of large public companies, such as 
directors of failed UK banks and financial institutions, are somewhat remote. 
There is clearly a major divide in the way the courts are used by shareholders in the 
US and in the UK. In many ways we have tended to follow American legal ideas and it may 
be that (perhaps through the influence of US investment funds) we might see more company 
law litigation against banks and financial institutions in the UK. However the prospects for 
this are really quite remote. 
Finally as the Northern Rock shareholder appeal has shown, even where actions are 
brought before the courts, it has been difficult to find causes of action that are likely to lead to 
successful outcomes for litigants; instead we have seen a failed resort to human rights 
arguments. This is, in part, a desperate attempt to overcome the difficulties associated with 
bringing successful shareholder actions based on more traditional company law principles. It 
can also perhaps be attributed to the development of public law principles of accountability 
which has not been contained by a market driven laissez-faire approach. 
 
